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Quantum key distribution over 25 km with an all-fiber continuous-variable system*

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Abstract

We report on the implementation of a reverse-reconciliated coherent-state continuous-variable quantum key distribution system, with which we generated secret keys at a rate of more than 2 kb/s over 25 km of optical fiber. Time multiplexing is used to transmit both the signal and phase reference in the same optical fiber. Our system includes all experimental aspects required for a field implementation of a quantum key distribution setup. Real-time reverse reconciliation is achieved by using fast and efficient LDPC error correcting codes.

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Contents

1	Introduction	2
2	Theoretical evaluation of the secret key rates	3
2.1	Entanglement-based CVQKD scheme	5
2.2	Individual attack — Shannon rate	8
2.3	Collective attack — Holevo rate	8
3	Implementation of continuous-variable quantum key distribution	10
3.1	Experimental setup	10
3.2	System automation	12
3.3	Experimental parameters and noise analysis	14
4	Reconciliation of continuous Gaussian variables	15
4.1	Multilevel reverse reconciliation with Low-Density Parity-Check codes	16
4.2	Practical implementation	19
4.3	Optimal reconciliation parameters	20
5	Privacy amplification	21
6	Generation of a secret key over a 25 km long fiber	22
7	Conclusion	24

1 Introduction

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) enables two remote parties, Alice and Bob, linked by a quantum channel and an authenticated classical channel, to share a common random binary key that is unknown to a potential eavesdropper, Eve. Many QKD protocols [1] encode key information in discrete variables of single photon light pulses, such as polarization or phase [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. Recently, other protocols using so-called continuous variables (CV), such as both quadratures of a coherent state, have been proposed [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. Channel symbols are formed by conjugate continuous quantum variables, linked by Heisenberg inequalities. The

secrecy of the QKD protocol is based on the resulting quantum uncertainty relations. Such protocols eliminate the need for single photon technology, as they only require standard off-the-shelf telecom components — such as diode lasers, electro-optics modulators, and PIN photodiodes — compatible with high repetition rates. On the other hand, CVQKD protocols require elaborate classical error correction algorithms to efficiently extract secret bits from correlated continuous variables.

In this paper, we describe a complete implementation of the coherent-state reverse-reconciliated (RR) CVQKD protocol described in [14]. In this protocol, the quadratures x and p of a train of coherent-state pulses are modulated in the complex plane with a centered bi-variate Gaussian modulation of variance $V_A N_0$, where N_0 is the shot noise variance that appears in the Heisenberg relation $\Delta x \Delta p \geq N_0$. These coherent states are sent from Alice to Bob through the quantum channel, along with a strong phase reference — or local oscillator (LO). Upon reception, Bob randomly measures the x or p quadrature by making the signal interfere with the LO in a pulsed, shot-noise limited homodyne detector. This protocol allows Alice and Bob to share a set of correlated Gaussian data. A random fraction of this set is publicly revealed to probe the transmission parameters, while the remaining part is used to build a secret key based on Bob’s data. This is achieved in practice with a classical error correction scheme called “Multi-Level Coding” using efficient one-way Low Density Parity Check (LDPC) codes. We report the full implementation of both quantum and classical parts of this RRCVQKD protocol over a standard single-mode telecom fiber of 25 km, leading to a final secret key distribution rate of more than 2 kb/s.

2 Theoretical evaluation of the secret key rates

In this Section, we detail the calculation of the secret key rates that are available to Alice and Bob when applying the RRCVQKD protocol. In QKD, one evaluates the secret key rate by upper bounding the information that the adversary, Eve, can acquire in the worst case. This is typically done under the following assumptions: (i) Eve has no limit in terms of computational power; (ii) Eve has full control over the quantum channel, and is only limited in her action on this channel by the laws of quantum physics; (iii) Eve can freely monitor the classical public channel used for key distillation, but she cannot modify the messages (authenticated channel); (iv) Eve has no access

to the laboratories (apparatuses) of Alice and Bob. Traditionally, the type of attacks that Eve can implement are ranked by increasing power into three classes, depending on how exactly she interacts with the pulses sent by Alice with auxiliary pulses (ancillae), and on when she measures these ancillae. The theoretical bound on Eve's information depends on the class of attacks that is considered:

- *Individual* attack: Eve interacts individually with each pulse sent by Alice, and stores her ancilla in a quantum memory. She then performs an appropriate measurement on her ancilla after the sifting procedure (during which Bob reveals whether he chose to measure x or p), but before the key distillation stage (in particular, before error correction). Using this attack, the maximum information accessible to Eve is bounded by the classical (Shannon [16, 17]) mutual information I_{BE} on Bob's data. Moreover, in the case of continuous-variable QKD, it is known that the optimal individual attack is a Gaussian operation [18], which considerably restricts the set of attacks that need to be considered and yields a simple closed formula for I_{BE} .
- *Collective* attack: Eve interacts individually with each pulse sent by Alice but, instead of measuring immediately after sifting, she listens to the communication between Alice and Bob during the key distillation procedure, and only then applies the optimal collective measurement on the ensemble of stored ancillae. In this attack, the maximum information she may have access to is limited by the Holevo bound χ_{BE} [19]. As in the case of individual attacks against continuous-variable QKD, Gaussian attacks have been shown to be optimal among all collective attacks [20, 21], which results in a simple expression for χ_{BE} .
- *Coherent* attack: This is the most powerful attack that Eve can implement. Here, she is allowed to interact collectively with all the pulses sent by Alice, and, after having monitored the key distillation messages, she applies an optimal joint measurement over all the ancillae. The security with respect to this kind of attacks is more complicated to address, but, under the assumption of the symmetry of the privacy amplification and channel probing protocols, it was proven for discrete-variable QKD in [22] (and conjectured for continuous-variable QKD in [20, 21]) that coherent attacks are not more efficient than collective attacks. This step is quite important as it ensures unconditional

security as long as one has a security proof with respect to collective attacks, for which the key rates are far simpler to evaluate.

In the following, we will consider individual and collective attacks, for which the security analysis lies on firm grounds. We will then derive expressions for I_{BE} and χ_{BE} as a function of the losses and of the noise of the quantum channel, assuming as usual that Eve can take both of them to her advantage. We will restrict our study to Gaussian attacks, which have been shown to be optimal [20, 21]; this significantly simplifies the calculation of the secret key rates since we only have to consider covariance matrices. It is known that Alice and Bob can distill perfectly correlated secret key bits provided that the amount of information they share, I_{AB} , remains higher than the information acquired by Eve (I_{BE} or χ_{BE} for reverse reconciliation). In this strictly information-theoretic point of view, and in the case of RR, we define the “raw” key rate as $\Delta I^{\text{Shannon}} = I_{AB} - I_{BE}$, or respectively $\Delta I^{\text{Holevo}} = I_{AB} - \chi_{BE}$.

2.1 Entanglement-based CVQKD scheme

An usual prepare-and-measure (P&M) implementation of a Gaussian protocol with coherent states has been described in Section 1, and consists in a quantum transmission followed by a classical data processing. During the quantum part, Alice randomly generates two numbers (x_A, p_A) from a Gaussian distribution, prepares a coherent state centered on (x_A, p_A) , and sends it to Bob through the quantum channel. Bob receives this state, and randomly measures the quadrature x or p by choosing the appropriate phase for his homodyne measurement.

As defined in Fig. 1, the quantum channel is characterized by its transmission $T \leq 1$ and its excess noise ε such that the noise variance at Bob’s input is $(1 + T\varepsilon)N_0$. We call $\chi_{\text{line}} = 1/T - 1 + \varepsilon$ the total channel added noise referred to the channel input, which is composed of the noise due to losses $1/T - 1$ and the excess noise ε . With these notations, all noises are expressed in shot noise units. The signal then reaches Bob’s detector, which is modeled by assuming that the signal is further attenuated by a factor η (detection losses) and mixed with some thermal noise (electronic noise v_{e1} added by the detection electronics, expressed in shot noise units). The total noise introduced by the realistic homodyne detector is $\chi_{\text{hom}} = (1 + v_{e1})/\eta - 1$, when referred to Bob’s input. The total noise added between Alice and Bob




Figure 1: Entanglement-based scheme of CVQKD. The transmittance T_A and η characterize the measurements at Alice's and Bob's sides, while the channel transmittance T and added noise χ_{line} are controlled by Eve. The QM box corresponds to Eve's quantum memory.

then reads $\chi_{\text{tot}} = \chi_{\text{line}} + \chi_{\text{hom}}/T$, referred to the channel input.

In the following, we will exploit the fact that this P&M description of QKD with Gaussian states is equivalent to the entanglement-based (EB) scheme presented in Fig. 1, which simplifies the theoretical calculation of the key rates and provides a unified description of the different existing protocols [23]. The main idea is to view Alice's quantum state preparation as resulting from the measurement of one half of a two-mode squeezed vacuum state (EPR state). The second half of the EPR state corresponds to the state sent to Bob through the quantum channel. The Gaussian state AB_0 is completely determined by its covariance matrix γ_{AB_0} , which has the form

$$\gamma_V^{\text{EPR}} = \begin{bmatrix} V \cdot 1 & \sqrt{V^2 - 1} \cdot \sigma_z \\ \sqrt{V^2 - 1} \cdot \sigma_z & V \cdot 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad (1)$$

where $1 = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$ and $\sigma_z = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 \end{bmatrix}$

where V is the variance, in shot noise units, of the thermal state that we observe if we trace out A . This thermal state also corresponds exactly to the thermal state observed at the output of Alice's station if we implement a P&M protocol, resulting from the ensemble of Gaussian-modulated coherent states (with some specific Gaussian distribution) [12, 13, 14, 24]. In fact,

every P&M scheme can be rigorously translated into an EB scheme. First, the generated states in a P&M scheme are equivalent to the states on which mode B_0 is projected after Alice's measurement in an EB scheme. Second, the modulation of the states in a P&M scheme corresponds in the EB scheme to the variation of the mean value of the state of mode B_0 conditioned on Alice's measurement. This implies that the modulation in the P&M scheme is directly related to Alice's measurement in the EB scheme via a one-to-one correspondence.

As an example, Alice applying a homodyne detection of x_A ($T_A = 1$) corresponds to projecting the mode B_0 onto squeezed states that are displaced according to a Gaussian distribution of the measured quadrature x_A . This is exactly equivalent to the protocol proposed in [12]. If she applies instead a heterodyne measurement ($T_A = 1/2$), she prepares coherent states modulated over a bi-dimensional Gaussian distribution of variance $V_A N_0$, as in [14, 13]. Let us focus on the equivalence between the EB scheme and the P&M scheme in this case. In the P&M scheme, Alice randomly chooses the values x_A and p_A distributed according to a Gaussian distribution centered on zero and of variance $V_A N_0$, and sends Bob a coherent state ($V_{B_0|A} = 1$ in shot noise units) centered on (x_A, p_A) . In the EB scheme, Alice estimates the quadratures x_{B_0} and p_{B_0} of the state sent to Bob by multiplying the outcomes of her measurements by a factor $\alpha = \sqrt{2\frac{V-1}{V+1}}$ (with a minus sign for p -quadrature) [23]. Her uncertainty on the inferred values of x_{B_0} and p_{B_0} for a given x_A and p_A is exactly $V_{B_0|A} = 1$, which corresponds to the uncertainty of a coherent state in the P&M scheme. The inferred values of x_{B_0} and p_{B_0} are distributed according to a Gaussian distribution of variance $V_A N_0 = (V - 1)N_0$, which coincides with Alice's modulation in the P&M scheme.

Note that the EB scheme allows us, at the same time, to simplify the description of the realistic detector at Bob side. As shown in Fig. 1, the inefficiency of Bob's detector is modeled by a beam splitter with transmission η , while the electronic noise v_{el} of Bob's detector is modeled by a thermal state ρ_{F_0} with variance $V_N N_0$ entering the other input port of the beam splitter, so that $V_N = 1 + v_{el}/(1 - \eta)$. Considering the thermal state ρ_{F_0} as the reduced state obtained from a two-mode squeezed state $\rho_{F_0 G}$ of variance $V_N N_0$ allows us to simplify the calculations.

2.2 Individual attack — Shannon rate

The mutual information I_{AB} is calculated directly from the variance $V_B N_0$ of the quadratures measured by Bob, with $V_B = \eta T (V + \chi_{\text{tot}})$, and the conditional variance $V_{B|A} = \eta T (1 + \chi_{\text{tot}})$ using Shannon’s equation

$$I_{AB} = \frac{1}{2} \log_2 \frac{V_B}{V_{B|A}} = \frac{1}{2} \log_2 \frac{V + \chi_{\text{tot}}}{1 + \chi_{\text{tot}}}. \quad (2)$$

In an individual attack, Eve performs her measurements just after Bob reveals the quadrature he has measured (sifting) but before the error correction. Her information is thus restricted to the Shannon information accessible in her ancilla after measurement, and is bounded using the entropic uncertainty relations as proven in [18]. In the RR protocol, the reference during the error correction protocol being Bob, Eve’s information reads

$$I_{BE} = \frac{1}{2} \log_2 \frac{V_B}{V_{B|E}} \quad (3)$$

where $V_B = \eta T (V + \chi_{\text{tot}})$ and $V_{B|E} = \eta \left[\frac{1}{T(1/V + \chi_{\text{line}})} + \chi_{\text{hom}} \right]$.

Note that we have considered the so-called “realistic model” suggested in [14], where Eve cannot benefit from the noise added by Bob’s apparatus, χ_{hom} . The Shannon “raw” key rate, proven secure against Gaussian or non-Gaussian, individual or finite-size attacks [18], then reads $\Delta I^{\text{Shannon}} = I_{AB} - I_{BE}$.

2.3 Collective attack — Holevo rate

In this case, the mutual information between Alice and Bob remains the same as in the case of individual attacks, namely Eq. (2). However, Eve’s accessible information is now upper bounded by the Holevo quantity [22],

$$\chi_{BE} = S(\rho_E) - \int dx_B p(x_B) S(\rho_E^{x_B}), \quad (4)$$

where $p(x_B)$ is the probability distribution of Bob’s measurement outcomes, $\rho_E^{x_B}$ is the state of Eve’s system conditional on Bob’s measurement outcome x_B , and $S(\rho)$ is the von Neumann entropy of the quantum state ρ [25]. For an n -mode Gaussian state ρ , this entropy reads

$$S(\rho) = \sum_i G \left(\frac{\lambda_i - 1}{2} \right), \quad (5)$$

where $G(x) = (x + 1) \log_2(x + 1) - x \log_2 x$ and λ_i are the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrix γ characterizing ρ . The calculation of Eve's information χ_{BE} is done using the following technique. First, we use the fact that Eve's system E purifies AB , so that $S(\rho_E) = S(\rho_{AB})$. Second, after Bob's projective measurement resulting in x_B , the system $A E F G$ (see Fig. 1) is pure, so that $S(\rho_E^{x_B}) = S(\rho_{AFG}^{x_B})$, where $S(\rho_{AFG}^{x_B})$ is independent of x_B for protocols with Gaussian modulation of Gaussian states. Thus, Eq. (4) becomes

$$\chi_{BE} = S(\rho_{AB}) - S(\rho_{AFG}^{x_B}), \quad (6)$$

and can be calculated from the covariance matrix γ_{AB} that is inferred from the channel probing, the detector efficiency η , and the detector electronic noise v_{e1} .

The entropy $S(\rho_{AB})$ is calculated from the symplectic eigenvalues $\lambda_{1,2}$ of the covariance matrix

$$\begin{aligned} \gamma_{AB} &= \begin{bmatrix} \gamma_A & \sigma_{AB} \\ \sigma_{AB}^T & \gamma_B \end{bmatrix} \\ &= \begin{bmatrix} V \cdot 1 & \sqrt{T(V^2 - 1)} \cdot \sigma_z \\ \sqrt{T(V^2 - 1)} \cdot \sigma_z & T(V + \chi_{\text{line}}) \cdot 1 \end{bmatrix} \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

The symplectic eigenvalues of γ_{AB} are given by

$$\lambda_{1,2}^2 = \frac{1}{2} \left[A \pm \sqrt{A^2 - 4B} \right], \quad (8)$$

where $A = V^2(1 - 2T) + 2T + T^2(V + \chi_{\text{line}})^2$ and $B = T^2(V \chi_{\text{line}} + 1)^2$. Similarly, the entropy $S(\rho_{AFG}^{x_B})$ is determined from the symplectic eigenvalues $\lambda_{3,4,5}$ of the covariance matrix characterizing the state $\rho_{AFG}^{x_B}$ after Bob's projective measurement, namely

$$\gamma_{AFG}^{x_B} = \gamma_{AFG} - \sigma_{AFG;B_1}^T (X \gamma_B X)^{\text{MP}} \sigma_{AFG;B_1}, \quad (9)$$

where $X = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$ and MP stands for the Moore Penrose inverse of a matrix. The matrices $\sigma_{AFG;B_1}$ in Eq. (9) can be read in the decomposition of the matrix

$$\gamma_{AFGB_1} = \begin{bmatrix} \gamma_{AFG} & \sigma_{AFG;B_1}^T \\ \sigma_{AFG;B_1} & \gamma_{B_1} \end{bmatrix}$$

which is obtained by rearranging the lines and columns of the matrix describing the system AB_1FG (see Fig. 1),

$$\begin{aligned} \gamma_{AB_1FG} &= Y^T [\gamma_{AB} \oplus \gamma_{F_0G}^{EPR}] Y \\ \text{where } Y &= (1_A \oplus S_{BF_0}^{BS} \oplus 1_G). \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

This matrix is obtained by applying onto systems B and F_0 a beam splitter transformation ($S_{BF_0}^{BS}$) that models the efficiency η of Bob's detector, where F_0 is the thermal state that models the electronic noise of the detector v_e . A long but straightforward calculation shows that the symplectic eigenvalues $\lambda_{3,4}$ are given by

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda_{3,4}^2 &= \frac{1}{2}(C \pm \sqrt{C^2 - 4D}) \\ \text{where } C &= \frac{V\sqrt{B} + T(V + \chi_{\text{line}}) + A\chi_{\text{hom}}}{T(V + \chi_{\text{tot}})} \\ \text{and } D &= \sqrt{B} \frac{V + \sqrt{B}\chi_{\text{hom}}}{T(V + \chi_{\text{tot}})}. \end{aligned} \quad (11)$$

while the last symplectic eigenvalue is simply $\lambda_5 = 1$.

The Holevo information bound then reads

$$\begin{aligned} \chi_{BE} &= G \left(\frac{\lambda_1 - 1}{2} \right) + G \left(\frac{\lambda_2 - 1}{2} \right) \\ &\quad - G \left(\frac{\lambda_3 - 1}{2} \right) - G \left(\frac{\lambda_4 - 1}{2} \right) \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

and the Holevo "raw" key rate, proven secure against collective attacks, reads $\Delta I^{\text{Holevo}} = I_{AB} - \chi_{BE}$.

3 Implementation of continuous-variable quantum key distribution

3.1 Experimental setup

The experimental setup for the CVQKD experiments that we have performed is shown in Fig. 2. It is a coherent-state QKD setup, operating at 1550 nm




Figure 2: Experimental setup for CVQKD.

and consisting entirely of standard fiber optics and telecommunication components. Alice uses a laser diode, pulsed with a repetition rate of 500 kHz, to generate pulses with a width of 100 ns. Using a highly asymmetric fiber-optic coupler, these pulses are split into a strong phase reference, the local oscillator (LO), containing typically 10^9 photons per pulse, and a weak signal. The signal pulses are displaced in the complex plane, with arbitrary amplitude and phase, randomly chosen from a two-dimensional Gaussian distribution centered at zero and with an adjustable variance $V_A N_0$. The selected amplitude and phase values are set by computer-driven electro-optics amplitude and phase modulators placed in the signal path. Finally, after part of the signal is removed for synchronization and system characterization purposes (see Section 3.2 for details), Alice's desired modulation variance is adjusted with a second amplitude modulator and a variable attenuator.

To avoid any polarization and phase drifts that may occur between the signal and LO over long-distance transmissions, and thus an incurred additional noise, both signal and LO pulses need to travel in the same optical fiber. Because of the simplicity of the corresponding setup, we have opted for time multiplexing, which is implemented by delaying the LO using an 80 m

fiber in its path and then combining the signal and LO pulses at the output of Alice’s setup, as shown in Fig. 2. Subsequently, the signal and LO pulses, separated by 400 ns, are sent to Bob via the quantum channel, which is a standard single-mode optical fiber coil.

Bob passively demultiplexes the signal and LO using a 90/10 fiber-optic coupler, thus introducing a 10% loss in the signal. Then, Bob selects the quadrature to be measured by adjusting the measurement phase with a computer-driven phase modulator placed in the LO path. Another 80 m delay line, placed now in the signal path, results in the signal and LO pulses overlapping at the output beamsplitter of the interferometer. To ensure a good interference contrast, the path difference between the signal and LO has to be adjusted to less than a centimeter. The selected quadrature measurement is then obtained with an all-fiber shot-noise limited time-resolved pulsed homodyne detection system. This measurement consists in the subtraction of the photocurrents of two fast InGaAs photodiodes followed by a low noise charge amplifier and a constant gain amplifying stage.

The choice of the coupling ratios for the multiplexing and demultiplexing couplers of the signal and LO in the described setup is the result of a trade-off. First, the intensity of the LO at the homodyne detection stage needs to be sufficiently high for the shot noise to be significantly higher than the electronic noise of the detector. Typically, more than 10^7 photons per pulse are required for this purpose. Second, signal losses at Bob’s site need to be minimized because they directly contribute to errors that decrease the mutual information between Alice and Bob. The coupling ratios quoted in Fig. 2 reflect this trade-off and fulfill the intensity level constraints and the stability requirements of the system.

3.2 System automation

Alice and Bob communicate via a synchronous automatic data processing software, described in detail in [26]. A key transmission is composed of independent blocks containing 50 000 pulses. Among these pulses, 10 000 are used as test pulses which have agreed amplitude and phase values, and serve the dual purpose of synchronizing Alice and Bob and determining the relative phase between the signal and the LO. An additional random subset of the raw data, typically 5 000 pulses, is used for statistical evaluation of the channel parameters, namely the channel transmission T and the excess noise ε , over this subset. In addition, the signal level sent by Alice and LO level received

by Bob are monitored in real-time on an individual pulse basis. Note that monitoring the LO level for each pulse also serves the purpose of avoiding potential “side-channel” attacks which might tamper classically with the LO intensity. When combined with an appropriate calibration, these measurements allow us to obtain an accurate estimate of the shot noise level at Bob’s site, which is used as a normalization factor. From this calibration, we can then determine the second order moments of the data distribution between Alice and Bob: $V_A N_0$, $V_B N_0$, and the correlation ρ . These moments yield the channel parameters T and ε , and the information rates. It is important to point out that T is measured both using test pulses of fixed amplitude and a subset of the raw data, and the agreement between the two values is continuously checked. Taking into account the fraction of pulses used in each block for synchronization and system characterization, the repetition rate effectively used for key distribution is 350 kHz. We note that higher repetition rates up to 1 MHz have been implemented.

We have designed a software that both manages the interface between Alice and Bob and ensures proper hardware operation, with features aiming towards the complete automation of the CVQKD system. A software feed-forward loop automatically adjusts every 10 seconds the bias voltages that need to be applied to the amplitude modulators in Alice’s site, thus compensating for thermal drifts that occur in the timescale of a few minutes. Furthermore, Alice’s output modulation variance is stabilized and controlled by a software loop to prevent natural drifts of the system from modifying the signal to noise ratio (SNR). This keeps the SNR within the range compatible with the reconciliation codes. At Bob’s site, another software drives Bob’s phase generator, using binary numbers provided by a quantum random number generator (id Quantique). This chosen phase is later compensated by the measurement of the relative phase between the signal and LO. The implementation of these automated procedures ensures a stable and reliable system operation with minimal human intervention. Finally, with the exception of the 50/50 coupler at the input of the homodyne detection system, the setups of Alice and Bob consist entirely of polarization-maintaining components. This means that polarization control is only required before the homodyne detector, and to compensate for polarization drifts in the quantum channel. The use of a polarization-maintaining homodyne detector and a software-driven low-loss dynamic polarization controller placed at the input of Bob’s setup allows the implementation of the required compensation while only inducing reasonable losses to the signal, and leads to fully automatic

operation of the QKD system.

3.3 Experimental parameters and noise analysis

In the previous sections we have described a system that produces correlated Gaussian-distributed continuous variables at an effective rate of 350 kHz. In order to obtain the raw key distribution rate from these correlations, we need to evaluate the losses and noise sources that are present in the system and degrade its performance. At Alice’s site, several sources of loss are present in the signal path, namely modulators (2.5 dB each), polarizers (0.3 dB), connectors (0.2 dB) or couplers. These losses do not affect the system performance because the signal level is set at Alice’s output. However, the losses in the LO path need to be controlled so that the intensity level is sufficient for the homodyne detection measurement, as we discussed in Section 3.1. The quantum channel is a 25 km single-mode optical fiber, which presents a loss of 5.2 dB. At Bob’s site, the losses of the components in the signal path deteriorate the transmission signal to noise ratio (SNR) and thus the amount of key information exchanged between Alice and Bob. Therefore, these losses must be minimized. To benefit from the “realistic mode” assumption described in Section 2, it is important to carefully calibrate Bob’s setup efficiency η because overestimating this value could open a security loophole in the system. The present overall efficiency, including the homodyne detection efficiency, is $\eta = 0.606$. Taking into account the measured value $T = 0.302$ for the channel transmission efficiency, we find that the overall transmission between Alice and Bob is $\eta T = 0.183$.

In addition to the noise introduced by the channel and homodyne detection losses, an excess noise due to technical limitations as well as an electronic noise introduced by the homodyne detection system are present in the system. The noises contributing to the excess noise ε can be independently determined from the experimental data, and lead to an excess noise of $\varepsilon = 0.005$ shot noise units for a modulation variance $V_A N_0 = 18.5 N_0$. As discussed in Section 3.2, during key transmission the excess noise is measured by the data processing software. This measurement was checked experimentally with the implementation of an intercept and resend attack, where we expect an excess noise of two shot noise units, corresponding to the “entanglement breaking” bound for the coherent-state CVQKD protocol [27]. It is important to point out that, in principle, the excess noise is not caused by Eve and could be considered inaccessible to her. However, because the diode

phase noise and the modulation noises depend on the modulation settings, it is difficult to accurately estimate and calibrate this excess noise. Thus, to avoid compromising the security of our implementation we assume that it is in fact generated and controlled by Eve. Finally, the homodyne detector electronic noise contributes $v_{el} = 0.041$ shot noise units to the total noise.

With the help of the equations given in Section 2, the noise measurements described above lead to the raw secret rates:

$$\begin{aligned}
 I_{AB} &= 365 \text{ kb/s}, & I_{BE} &= 313 \text{ kb/s} \\
 \Delta I^{\text{Shannon}} &= \mathbf{52 \text{ kb/s}} \\
 I_{AB} &= 365 \text{ kb/s}, & \chi_{BE} &= 316 \text{ kb/s} \\
 \Delta I^{\text{Holevo}} &= \mathbf{49 \text{ kb/s}}
 \end{aligned}$$

To obtain a secret key from this information, available in the form of raw Gaussian correlated data, we have to efficiently extract a string of secret bits from this data. This is the subject of the next section, which focuses on the Shannon rate. A very similar procedure can be applied to the Holevo rate.

4 Reconciliation of continuous Gaussian variables

In photon-counting based QKD protocols, data is readily available as binary digits and can be easily processed for error correction and privacy amplification using well-known protocols such as Cascade [28] or Winnow [29]. The amount of secret key that can be extracted from these error-correction algorithms depends on the error rate of the noisy key. On the other hand, continuous-variable QKD protocols only provide Alice and Bob with sequences of correlated Gaussian symbols, from which various noise variances are determined [27]. In particular, the variance of the excess noise is the analog of the error rate in photon-counting QKD protocols. From these variances, the mutual informations I_{AB} and I_{BE} can be deduced, and thus the secret key rate. Therefore, for CVQKD protocols high secret key distribution rates are attainable, provided that the secret information $\Delta I^{\text{Shannon}} = I_{AB} - I_{BE}$ available from the raw Gaussian data can be efficiently extracted. >From a strict information-theoretic perspective there exists no fundamental limitations to this extraction process. However, in practice, error correction requires more information exchange than predicted by Shannon's theory. The

raw secret information rate is therefore decreased to the effective secret rate $\Delta I_{\text{eff}}^{\text{Shannon}} = \beta I_{AB} - I_{BE}$, where the efficiency $\beta < 1$ characterizes how close the reconciliation algorithm operates with respect to the Shannon limit (see Section 4.1). Since the maximum achievable transmission distance ultimately depends on the value of β , designing efficient reconciliation algorithms is one of the challenges of CVQKD. The efficiency of the first reconciliation algorithms used for CVQKD [30, 31] did not reach 80% for significant line losses, which limited the maximum transmission distance to less than 20 km. In what follows, we first briefly review the key principles of a more efficient algorithm presented in [32], and then focus on its practical implementation.

4.1 Multilevel reverse reconciliation with Low-Density Parity-Check codes

Let X denote the random variable representing Alice’s Gaussian symbols and Y the one representing Bob’s symbols. In theory Alice and Bob should be able to extract up to $I(X; Y)$ common bits from their correlated sequence. Following the idea of [30], Bob first quantizes his data to obtain discrete symbols, represented by the variable $\mathcal{Q}(Y)$, and assigns a binary label to each of them. The quantization necessarily reduces the amount of extractable information $I(X, \mathcal{Q}(Y)) < I(X; Y)$; however, the penalty can be made negligible by choosing the quantizer \mathcal{Q} to maximize the mutual information $I(X; \mathcal{Q}(Y))$. In order to allow Alice to recover his bit sequence without errors, Bob should then send redundant information, such as the value of parity-check equations. The theoretical number of such redundancy bits is $H(\mathcal{Q}(Y)|X)$ [33], however in practice perfect error correction is only possible when the number of bits disclosed M_{rec} exceeds this limit. The efficiency β of a practical reconciliation algorithm is then defined as:

$$\beta = \frac{H(\mathcal{Q}(Y)) - M_{\text{rec}}}{I(X; Y)} \leq \frac{I(X; \mathcal{Q}(Y))}{I(X; Y)} \leq 1. \quad (13)$$

The principle of our reconciliation scheme is shown in Fig. 3. Once his Gaussian symbols $\{y_i\}$ have been quantized into $\{\mathcal{Q}(y_i)\}$, Bob assigns a L -bits binary label $\{\ell_j(y_i)\}_{j=0..L-1}$ to each of them, and calculates a set of parity bits (or *syndromes*) for each individual level j of label bits. In our case, the number of levels in the multilevel reconciliation is $L = 4$. This particular encoding incurs no loss of performance, and the ideal number of




Figure 3: Principle of multilevel reconciliation with LDPC codes.

parity bits to disclose at each level can be precisely calculated [32]. The levels corresponding to the less significant bits often require almost as many parity bits as there are data bits, and in this case Bob can simply disclose the entire level. For the levels corresponding to more significant bits, the parity bits are calculated according to the parity-check matrix of Low Density Parity Check (LDPC) codes. Finally, a few extra parity bits are obtained by applying an algebraic code (such as a BCH code [34]) to the whole data sequence.

Alice retrieves Bob’s bit sequence by decoding the bit levels successively, using her Gaussian symbols $\{x_i\}$ and the syndromes sent by Bob. As illustrated in Fig. 3, the decoding of a level also exploits the results obtained at the decoding of the previous levels. The standard decoding algorithm of LDPC codes (*Sum-Product* [35]) may sometimes leave a few errors uncorrected, however the parity bits obtained with the algebraic code are usually sufficient to correct them.

In comparison with the algorithm proposed in [30], which introduced slice reconciliation with turbo codes, the good efficiency obtained with this algorithm stems from three key features. First, codes applied at each level are state-of-the-art LDPC error correcting codes. Then, the reliability associated to the decision (so-called *soft decoding*) output from these codes is used as an *a priori* for the decoding of other levels, rather than only the bit estimate issued by each decoder. Finally, we allow several iterations between the levels. In fact, soft decoding enables us to start the decoding of a level j even if the previous level $j - 1$ has not been successfully corrected. A later attempt at decoding level $j - 1$ might benefit from a partial decoding of level j and could

terminate successfully. In addition, the exchange of information during the whole reconciliation process is unidirectional, which leaves no ambiguity on the information intercepted by the eavesdropper.

It was shown in [32], that LDPC codes with a block length of 200 000 bits were sufficient to achieve efficiencies above 85% over a wide range of SNR.

The efficiency β characterizes the ultimate performance of a reconciliation algorithm, however it only assesses its performance from an information-theoretic standpoint and does not account for the associated computational complexity. In practice, the latter is of uttermost importance if one hopes to obtain high secret key distribution rates. Before going on to the details of the implementation of our algorithm, it is worthwhile discussing the trade-off between efficiency and decoding complexity. Increasing the reconciliation efficiency while still maintaining an arbitrarily low probability of decoding error would require LDPC codes operating closer to the Shannon limit as well as many more iterations in the decoding process. It is clear that the code block length and decoding complexity of this scheme would then quickly become prohibitive. However, a better trade-off can be obtained by maintaining an arbitrarily low probability of undetected errors. In fact, if the reconciliation algorithm detects all decoding failures with high probability but fails to correct errors with probability p_{fail} , the effective secret information rate becomes $\Delta I_{\text{eff}}^{\text{Shannon}} = (\beta I_{AB} - I_{BE})(1 - p_{\text{fail}})$. It is difficult to obtain an analytical expression of p_{fail} as a function of β due to the iterative nature of the decoding process, however we observed via Monte-Carlo simulation that β could be increased by a few percents without too much sacrifice on p_{fail} . Table 1 shows our simulation results obtained for a mutual information $I(X;Y) = 1$ bit/symbol, a 4-bit quantization, length 200 000 LDPC codes, and for a BCH code rate of 0.998 to obtain the extra parity bits. No undetected errors appeared during the simulations.

LDPC code rates	β	p_{fail}
0/0/0.42/0.94	86.7%	0
0/0/0.44/0.94	88.7%	10^{-4}

Table 1: Simulation results.

4.2 Practical implementation

As mentioned earlier, the efficiency of the reconciliation strongly depends on how close the LDPC codes operate with respect to their ideal limit. High efficiency is therefore only achievable with relatively large block length (typically over 100 000 bits) and randomly constructed codes [35], which makes a hardware implementation of the algorithm unrealistic. To date, high decoding throughputs on Field Programmable Gated Arrays (FPGAs) have only been obtained with structured short length codes, which specific structure allowed a certain amount of parallelism. In our situation, a software implementation of the algorithm turned out to be the only viable solution. Typical software implementations of the Sum-Product decoding algorithm are rather slow, however the execution speed can be substantially improved by performing fixed-point operations and approximating computationally intensive functions with table look-ups [36]. These simplifications yield a significant overall speed gain with a negligible performance degradation. The convergence speed of the LDPC codes can also be accelerated by using a modified version of the standard Sum-Product decoding algorithm [37]. A simple change in the scheduling of the decoding reduces the number of iterations by a factor almost two without any penalty in terms of performance.

In the situation of interest for CVQKD, most of the complexity of the reconciliation algorithm comes from the use of two LDPC codes of same block length. The decoding complexity depends on many parameters, such as the number of iterations performed during the decoding of each code, the number of times each level is decoded, the average number of terms involved in parity-check equations, etc. For a desired level of performance, there exists no generic method for finding a set of parameters minimizing the complexity because all parameters interplay in a complex manner. For instance, choosing “better” codes operating closer to the Shannon limit could reduce the number of iterations required in each LDPC decoder, but the size of the parity-check equations would generally increase. Likewise, increasing the number of iterations within a LDPC decoder may sometimes reduce the number of iterations required between different decoders. Hence the choice of the parameters described hereafter results from many heuristic optimizations.




Figure 4: Effective key distribution rate as a function of the SNR, or equivalently, as a function of the modulation variance $V_A N_0$. We assume a linear dependence of ε on V_A , and use the experimental parameters given in Section 3. The curves show the key distribution rate for values of β ranging from 0.6 to 1.0, and the filled circles show the efficiency we actually achieve for different SNR.

4.3 Optimal reconciliation parameters

Although code parameters cannot be deduced from an analytical calculation, the optimal modulation variance is the result of a quantitative compromise. The reconciliation efficiency only depends on the SNR of the transmission, which, for a given distance, is an increasing function of the modulation variance $V_A N_0$. However, as shown in Fig. 4, the effective secret rate $\Delta I_{\text{eff}}^{\text{Shannon}} = \beta I_{AB} - I_{BE}$ as a function of V_A and SNR clearly exhibits an optimal value for V_A . For the targeted transmission distance of 25 km ($T = 0.302$) and considering the detector efficiency and noise discussed in the previous section, which require a reconciliation efficiency above 80%, we obtained the best performance/complexity trade-off with the following parameters:

- modulation variance $V_A N_0 = 18.5 N_0$ ($I(X; Y) = 1.045$ bit/symbol),
- quantization with 16 equally spaced intervals ($I(X; \mathcal{Q}(Y)) = 1.019$ bit/symbol), ideally requiring 4 codes with rates 0.002/0.013/0.456/0.981,
- practical codes rates 0/0/0.42/0.95, yielding an efficiency $\beta = 0.898$.

These reconciliation parameters are adjusted as the line parameters (namely the excess noise) fluctuate, and yield the following secret key distribution rates:

$$\Delta I_{\text{eff}}^{\text{Shannon}} = 15.2 \text{ kb/s} \quad \Delta I_{\text{eff}}^{\text{Holevo}} = 12.3 \text{ kb/s}$$

Since the LDPC codes are very demanding in computing power, the reconciliation speed is directly affected by the processor speed. The use of one core of a dedicated Core 2 Duo Intel processor leads to a reconciliation speed of 40 000 Gaussian symbols/s, while using a NVidia GTX 7950 graphics processor allows a speed of 63 000 symbols/s, to be compared with the current repetition rate of 350 000 symbols/s. Taking into account this speed limitation, the final (net) secure key distribution rates are:

Using a Core 2 Duo CPU:

$$\Delta I_{\text{net}}^{\text{Shannon}} = 1.7 \text{ kb/s} \quad \Delta I_{\text{net}}^{\text{Holevo}} = 1.4 \text{ kb/s}$$

Using a GTX 7950 GPU:

$$\Delta I_{\text{net}}^{\text{Shannon}} = 2.7 \text{ kb/s} \quad \Delta I_{\text{net}}^{\text{Holevo}} = 2.2 \text{ kb/s}$$

We note that the reconciliation procedure described above has been optimized for the case of the Shannon entropy, and further optimization should be considered to achieve a higher Holevo rate.

5 Privacy amplification

At the end of the reconciliation process, the classical error correction algorithm outputs blocks of $b = 400\,000$ bits (*i.e.* the two most significant quantization levels of blocks of $n = 200\,000$ continuous variables), and each of them needs to be compressed into a much shorter secret key of typically $k = 10\,000$ secret bits, depending on the measured secret key distribution rate. In order not to affect the overall classical processing speed, this particularly large input size requires us to use fast privacy amplification algorithms. Privacy amplification [38] consists in randomly choosing a *hash function* mapping bit strings of length b to bit strings of length k , among a suitable set of these functions called a *family*. The probability of success of these algorithms is characterized by the universality ϵ of the family of hash functions, and the security parameter s , *i.e.* the number of bits that are sacrificed during the amplification process. Quantitatively, the probability that Eve knows one

bit of the final key is about $\max(2^{-s}, \epsilon - 1)$ [39]. For universal families of hash functions, defined by $\epsilon = 1$, only the security parameter s is therefore relevant. The size of the resulting secret key is then $k = n\Delta I_{\text{eff}}^{\text{Shannon}} - s$.

The simplest practical universal family of hash functions is the multiplication by a random element of the Galois field $GF(2^l)$ with $l > b$ [38]. The number theoretic transform (NTT), a FFT-like algorithm in $GF(2^l)$ enables us to rapidly perform this multiplication [39]. Still, the amplification of 400 000 bits with this algorithm takes about 10 seconds on an average desktop computer, which is about as long as the whole reconciliation process, thus significantly decreasing the final secret key rate.

To avoid this long computation time, we use instead a non-universal family of hash functions based on the NTT described in [39] (section 7.3.3). In this algorithm, we first convert the incoming bit string into a vector of L_p elements of the Galois field $GF(p)$ ($L_p = 2^{14}$ and $p = 33\,832\,961$ are suitable for our input string length). Then we compute the inverse NTT of the component-wise product of the generated vector with a random vector with no zero element. The hash output is then obtained by converting back the result to a bit string, which is then truncated to the desired key length. This hash function evaluation only requires a few tens of milliseconds, but its universality is $\epsilon_1 = 1 + \frac{k}{p} \simeq 1 + 5 \cdot 10^{-4}$, allowing for security parameters up to only about 10. To overcome this problem, we combine this algorithm with the universal ($\epsilon_2 = 1$) family of hash functions based on the multiplication in $GF(2^m)$. For this, we first non-universally hash our b bits into $m = 19\,937$ bits for which we know a Galois field, and then universally hash these resulting bits into $k \simeq 10\,000$ bits. Although this second hashing algorithm is much slower, the execution time is still tolerable due to the reduced input size. The universality of the total composite hashing is $\epsilon_c = 2^{k-19\,937} \epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2$ [40], and so $\epsilon_c - 1$ is small enough to allow virtually any reasonable security parameter. On a desktop computer, the total hashing time is 0.27 s per block, of which 0.2 s are consumed by the second hashing.

6 Generation of a secret key over a 25 km long fiber

To finalize our CVQKD system, we designed a software implementing the classical channel between Alice and Bob. This software continuously retrieves

Gaussian data from the software driving the experiment, and performs error correction and privacy amplification. It features an authentication backend interface that is currently using the authentication algorithms developed by the European Integrated Project SECOQC [41]. With the system described in the previous sections, which combines CVQKD hardware and key distillation software, we have been able to transmit a binary secret key over a 25 km long fiber coil with a final secret key distribution rate of 2 kb/s. This rate takes into account the entire key distillation procedure, including the classical channel latency. By evaluating our transmission parameters for different channel transmissions we obtain the raw and effective key distribution rate curves shown in Fig. 5.




Figure 5: Raw and effective key distribution rates for communication secure against individual (Shannon) and collective (Holevo) attacks. The reconciliation efficiency for the effective key distribution rates is assumed to be $\beta = 0.898$. The parameters used in the calculations are $V_A N_0 = 18.5 N_0$, $\varepsilon = 0.005$, $\eta = 0.606$, $v_{e1} = 0.041$, the effective repetition rate is 350 kHz, and the fiber loss is assumed to be 0.2 dB/km.

7 Conclusion

In conclusion, we have presented the implementation of a complete continuous-variable quantum key distribution system, generating secret keys at a rate of more than 2 kb/s over 25 km of optical fiber. The system is secure against individual and collective attacks, when using Shannon or Holevo information bounds, respectively. A single program drives hardware automation, signal modulation and measurement, and performs authentication, reverse reconciliation, and privacy amplification. Our QKD setup is therefore fully functional and meets all aspects required for a field implementation.

Currently, the secret key rate is limited by data processing and data acquisition, rather than by optical components. Further improvements of the reconciliation algorithms, as well as the use of faster components (CPUs and data acquisition cards), should thus lead to a direct enhancement of the key rate.

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